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Title: TIMWE: IPO go or no go? 
This case study describes the path TIMWE followed from its creation in 2002 up to 
2012, highlighting its portfolio of services and the expansion strategy. It addresses the 
two IPO attempts, including the main steps involved, namely the selection of the 
underwriters and of the market. It briefly describes the main challenges the company 
had to face, from reputational issues of being a Portuguese company to external factors 
that fell beyond the company’s control. The chosen company – TIMWE – is a 
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TIMWE: IPO go or no go? 
May 17
th
, 2012, was another day of road show for Diogo Salvi, founder and 
Chief Executive Officer of TIMWE, and his team. For 2 weeks they had travelled 
around the US and Europe to “sell” the company, marketing the initial public offering 
(IPO) of TIMWE, a global provider of mobile monetization solutions. Throughout this 
period, Salvi had heavily relied on investment bankers to reach the right investors. 
These were attracted by TIMWE’s business model, which they could easily understand, 
and by the company’s incredible growth records. However, non-controllable factors - 
namely the market uncertainty and the disappointing outcome of Velti, TIMWE’s main 
comparable - seemed to scare away potential investors and to drive valuations down. 
Going public in NASDAQ would increase brand recognition, while providing 
liquidity to the company. Even though TIMWE could “survive” without this capital 
injection, being a public company would allow future access to capital markets. This 
was the second time TIMWE was trying to do an IPO, having failed an attempt the year 
before. Postponing the first attempt was justified by unfavourable market conditions and 
investors would hardly misinterpret this decision, but the consequences of calling off a 
second IPO attempt could be tremendous and this could be the last chance to take the 
company public. 
Foundation 
After graduating from a business school – ISCTE Business School in Portugal –, 
Diogo Salvi became a “banking consultant”, devoting a significant part of his career to 
the strategic development of leading Portuguese banks, namely Banco Best and Banco 
Comercial Português (BCP). From 1992 until 2001, he did projects in many areas 
including restructuring (commercial and IT), innovation (e.g. phone as a banking 
channel), internationalization and mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  
Salvi could recognize a promising business opportunity and, in 2001, he realized 
that investing in the mobile-phone industry could be an interesting challenge. This was 
sparked by a series of factors, such as the opportunity to commercialize mobile content 
for a group of Dutch businessmen
1
 and the growing worldwide importance of mobile-
phones. This was a sector with undeniable potential since, in 2000, countries such as the 
                                                             
1 This group was devoted to the production of mobile rings, games and other mobile contents. 
2 
 
United Kingdom and Singapore had more than 70% mobile penetration
2
, and others 
such as Brazil and Colombia had less than 15%, meaning that there was room to grow 
and to exploit this undeveloped market. Exhibit 1 presents a more extensive list of 
penetration rates for selected countries. 
From the beginning, the idea was to be headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal, and to 
focus on emerging markets. TIMWE’s initial bet would be Mobile Entertainment, 
playing the role of an intermediary, gently imposing its presence as a global provider of 
monetization solutions. This was a high potential business that, if properly managed, 
could allow for a scaling of operations, resulting in reduced costs. However, given the 
nature of the activity, it was also exposed to a series of risks that, if materialized, could 
put the company in jeopardy. 
Although Salvi had the passion and the vision, he lacked the technical skills 
needed to be successful. He was determined to find someone to complement his skills 
and Ricardo Carvalho and Paulo Salgado seemed to be the perfect match. At the time, 
they were working with a platform that provided mobile content management and 
delivery solutions. This would pose an important advantage since they knew the 
business and the market and they had the technical skills needed to form a 
complementary and cohesive team. 
Ricardo Carvalho studied physical education but his professional career 
followed a different direction. His first project in the business area was the co-
foundation and management of a sports web portal - infodesporto.pt – in 1996, which 
was sold in 2000 to Portugal Telecom. The conjunction of a growing media market and 
his enthusiasm about the business world led him to become an advisor in many leading 
mobile marketing and entertainment firms, as well as in Cofina
3
. In Cofina, he was 
consultant on the media, internet and customer relation management areas for the Board 
of Directors, a role that gave him different and complementary perspectives of the 
business. Carvalho had an impressive track record and the entrepreneurial spirit needed 
to embrace this enterprise. 
In 2002, Salvi and Carvalho co-founded TIMWE, which resulted from the 
combination of Salvi’s business idea and Carvalho’s platform, with little initial 
investment. In the initial phase, contacts to attract potential clients were made from 
Salvi’s garage and the services offered were linked to the reselling of mobile 
entertainment. By that time, they had the tools to enter the market of entertainment 
solutions for mobile phones and take advantage of a promising market. 
The first phase, finding a co-founder who could add value to the project, was 
successfully completed. Salvi was nominated CEO and Chairperson of the Executive 
                                                             
2
 Ratio of mobiles/credit cards/internet access per inhabitants. 
3 Cofina is a leading Portuguese media group. It started in 1995 with a share capital of 5 M€ and by 2002 it had 
already acquired Investec, a media holding; “Correio da Manhã”, daily newspaper; and “TV Guia”, a TV magazine. 
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Committee and Carvalho was nominated Managing Partner. Later, in 2003, Paulo 
Salgado was nominated Chief Technology Officer (CTO). Exhibit 2 provides 
information regarding the main shareholders and ownership distribution. 
Expansion 
From the beginning, Salvi knew there were a large number of companies with 
greater insight and expertise on the business and a wider network. Nonetheless, he 
aimed to grow through internationalization, opening local offices in markets not very 
appealing to other companies but with a hidden potential, from TIMWE’s perspective. 
TIMWE has been headquartered in Lisbon since 2002 and the first pilot projects 
were hosted in the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Colombia and Argentina. After a 
successful road show conducted by the owners in Latin America, in 2003, they decided 
to open two offices in Colombia and Argentina (2005). The focus became obvious: 
emerging markets characterized by high growth rates and few competitors.  
From 2006 onwards, 23 more offices were opened according to the company’s 
strategic plan and market opportunities. In 2008, the existence of important clients in 
Spain triggered the opening of an office in that country. In the same year, the 
continuous search for new places to establish an office led Salvi and Carvalho to make a 
risky move and invest in Mozambique. They could anticipate a huge potential from the 
then-low penetration of mobile phones, and they wanted to be already well-known when 
the market started to grow, since this would give them a unique advantage against future 
competitors. Exhibit 3 presents information regarding the internationalization process. 
As of May 2012, TIMWE was present in more than 75 countries, had 26 offices 
in different locations, worked with more than 280 carriers worldwide and could reach 3 
billion mobile users. As can be seen in exhibit 4, TIMWE’s services were spread all 
over the world and its ambition was to continue this expansion policy. Exhibit 5 
provides data regarding revenue distribution, from 2009 until 2011, per geography. 
Being a global company with physical presence in different geographies posed a 
significant advantage vis-à-vis companies that operate locally and have no international 
exposure and those that are international yet lack local insight. TIMWE knew it could 
only build a sustainable business model if it could successfully apply its firm-wide 
knowledge to each local market. Although there was a common pattern regarding the 
level of development of the countries, the demands were specific and the best way to 
address them was with local knowledge. This was the reason why the company decided 
to recruit local talent to form the local teams. The recruitment process was not an easy 
task, since it was time-consuming and required financial investment for training. 
Nonetheless, looking back at the outcome of this decision, gains clearly outweighed 
costs, and so this policy was still in practice after all these years.  
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TIMWE’s aim of being a global integrated company could be troublesome given 
the design of the organizational structure, where local offices were entitled with 
decision power. It posed a colossal challenge since, due to the diversity of 
characteristics of its clients, procedures and business decisions could not be 
standardized. In order to keep the cohesion of the company as a whole, TIMWE 
promoted continuous training sessions where local managers were exposed to the global 
picture and to the vision and strategy that the company intended to reach as a whole. 
Company overview 
 Mobile Entertainment  
TIMWE’s initial role was to act as an intermediary between the producers of 
entertainment content and mobile operators. This was a value-added service for both: 
content owners would sell their contents in many carriers without entering into 
negotiations or maintaining relationships, and mobile carriers would have tailor-made 
content without spending time and resources developing it or finding partners. By that 
time, content monetization services
4
 were offered as “white labels” to carriers, who 
would then rebrand it with their own brands. 
Although TIMWE allowed end users to choose from a wide portfolio that 
included games, music, videos, images and applications, it was permanently concerned 
about offering the fashionable and popular content, implying a continuous effort to 
analyse market trends and needs. These services were provided using a cloud-
computing platform. The major advantages of using this non-physical platform were the 
savings associated with the lack of infrastructure’s investment and the ability to increase 
capacity without additional costs.  
By that time, services were mainly provided to European mobile operators. 
 By 2004, TIMWE developed its own platform, allowing end users to buy 
directly from the company content that was either self-developed or controlled by it. 
From then on, in order to effectively distribute contents with its own brand, TIMWE 
marketed these services among mobile-users. This platform was compatible across 
models of basic mobile phones and smartphones, bringing versatility to the company to 
adapt to market changes.  
 Mobile Marketing 
 By 2007, the crucial decision of entering the mobile marketing was taken. The 
company started to offer a complete service comprising the conception of the marketing 
campaign, its implementation and the analysis of its results. TIMWE was able to exploit 
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 The concept of content monetization services means that the company can extract money from the services 




synergies between mobile entertainment and mobile marketing, increasing investment 
less than proportionally to the turnover since this service also used the same cloud-
computing platform. 
At this time, this was an innovative product that was offered to mobile operators, 
brand owners, governments, NGOs and media groups. The choice, by a client, of a 
company to develop the marketing campaign was based on a set of decisive factors. For 
example, TIMWE’s relationship with many carriers worldwide was a guarantee that the 
message would reach more end users. Additionally, the accumulated know-how derived 
from its international presence could be extrapolated to other campaigns, posing an 
incredible advantage against other companies. Moreover, having local offices would 
provide a better insight of the market, easing the process of developing a customised 
and effective campaign, i.e., adapted to each particular market and segment. This was 
perceived as a value-adding service to its clients, e.g., governments used it to 
communicate with its citizens regarding important issues, such as, vaccination, elections 
and poverty. More than being a cheap way to reach people, this was a user friendly 
service
5
. Besides these institutional campaigns, media groups, as well as other 
worldwide well-known brands, had also used these services, as it was the case of 
Kellogg’s with the “Special K calories counter” in Mexico or Coca-Cola’s initiative in 
Angola to alert clients to substitute cans for bottles, since the latter could be recycled. A 
list of the top clients, in terms of revenue, is presented in exhibit 6. 
 TIMWE Lab was created in 2009, in a decision triggered by the need to better 
study market trends, research and develop products and be in the vanguard of 
innovation. The establishment of their own independent research and development 
incubator in Covilhã, Portugal, represented the achievement of an important milestone. 
Being ahead of the competition and having the first mover advantage was a central part 
of the strategy of the company
6
. 
 Mobile Money 
By 2010, the mobile entertainment and mobile marketing areas were well-
established, presenting impressive results. Nonetheless, top management identified a 
new area that could be important to cover another segment of the market – mobile 
money (2010). This was something that would need no financial effort since it was 
already used internally and it would use the same platform as the other services. 
In mobile money, TIMWE would play the role of an intermediary between 
consumer-facing micropayment providers and mobile carriers, offering a billing 
solution for the purchase of digital contents. The process was simple: end users chose 
the content they wanted to purchase (e.g., download premium contents or download 
music) and it was charged directly to the phone regardless of whether it had a pre-paid 
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 Corporate messages follow four steps: choose the target, write the message, set date and, finally, send it. 
6 R&D expenses amounted to 4,5 M€ (2010) and 6,2 M€ (2011). 
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or post-paid plan. The biggest advantage of choosing the company to this role was the 
large number of potential clients that would have access to this solution. 
In the European context, where the banking system was established and safe, 
this could be perceived as a no value-adding service. However, the reality was very 
different in emerging countries, where banks’ services and credit cards were not used by 
the majority of people (exhibit 7) and the degree of safety was not satisfactory. 
As TIMWE realised that this service could be sold to other companies, it created 
a distinct brand named “M-Coin”. This solution could be used by developers and 
publishers for in-Game and in-App monetization and by online merchants for digital 
goods and digital services monetization
7
. For example, TIMWE had implemented a 
micropayment solution for Habbo
8
 in Latin America. Just one SMS away, end users 
could authorize the purchase of a virtual roller skating ring or a virtual luxury 
swimming pool for the virtual hotel. Exhibit 8 refers an example of how the service is 
provided to the end user. By the end of 2011, the three main clients in terms of revenue 
were XGranted, Habbo and Himedia. 
 From one service to a portfolio 
TIMWE’s portfolio of services had changed throughout the time and, what used 
to be exclusively a reseller of mobile entertainment, evolved and expanded into the 
mobile marketing (2007) and the mobile money (2010) markets. The introduction of 
each service was the result of the consumers’ demands and the company’s recognition 
that it needed to follow customers, otherwise they would “lose the train”. 
Throughout the years, mobile marketing and mobile money have been 
solidifying their position as a winning bet in terms of revenues. As can be seen in 
exhibit 9, from 2009 till 2011, revenues of these two services increased more than two-
fold. These represented, in 2011, more than 50% of the pie. To ensure the continued 
success of these services, TIMWE had to continue satisfying the market’s needs and to 
explore synergies between the services. 
The competition TIMWE faced in its three services was intense, fragmented and 
prone to increase. This was a response to the perceived high growth potential of these 
services, driven by the expected growing adoption of mobile phone in emerging markets 
(exhibit 10). Competition can be a blessing or a curse depending on how companies 
face it: it can be either a trigger for innovation, commitment and evolution, or an excuse 
for failure. In TIMWE’s case, it was clearly a blessing that pushed the company forward 
and pushed it to the right level of ambition. Nonetheless, TIMWE did not identify a 
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 For example, end users can access paid internet wireless in airports, with the cost charged from the phone balance. 
This digital service is bought through M-coin.  
8 Habbo is a website were players can create an identity and a virtual life. 
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truly comparable competitor that was able to provide the three services at an 
international scale. 
Taking into account all these changes and evolutions, TIMWE became a more 
sophisticated company with a more diverse portfolio of services. It could cover a wider 
range of clients, provide a more complete and integrated service, and achieve economies 
of scope. This was the result of a demanding and fragmented market, with fierce local 
competition and a product that could easily become obsolete if changes did not keep 
pace with the technological evolution.  
Industry characteristics 
 The mobile service industry is highly dependent on diverse factors such as 
technological innovation, trends and degree of development of countries, and 
consequently, penetration of mobile devices and internet. As can be seen in exhibit 11, 
mobile-phone penetration increased from 18,4% in 2002 to 77,2% in 2011, while 
internet access increased from 10,7% to 32,7%, for the same period. 
 This industry is characterized by a rapid rate of innovation, meaning that 
companies have to be able to adapt its products and services, otherwise they will 
quickly become obsolete. Moreover, subscribers require more than the traditional voice 
and text-based services, demanding a wider range of data and content services. While 
this poses a risk, it is also a great opportunity for companies to beat the competition. 
Only those who can anticipate market trends and needs will be able to secure their 
position. The growing penetration of smartphones
9
 exemplifies this since mobile 
carriers and their partners will have to redesign their offers. As end users demand more 
services with a higher degree of complexity, mobile carriers will have to make a 
strategic decision of whether to join forces with specialized companies, as TIMWE, or 
whether to invest in in-house development. 
 Emerging markets 
From day one, TIMWE found emerging markets attractive because of its 
population growth and consequent expected GDP growth above the world average
10
. 
Given the increasing mobile phone adoption and low internet penetration
11
, end users 
needed to rely on the services provided by mobile phones. These were the markets to 
explore.  
                                                             
9 Smartphones were expected to constitute 8% of total mobile connections in Latin America and 4% of total mobile 
connections in the Middle East and Africa in 2011, according to the World Cellular Information Service (2011). 
10 The GDP CAGR for the World economy is 5,3% and for the Emerging and Development markets is 7,9%, based on 
information of the “World Economic Outlook Database”, April 2013, by IMF. This calculus was done for the horizon 
of 6 years - from 2012 up to 2018. 
11 According to data from the ITU, as of 31st December 2011, internet penetration in developed markets (1) was 
74%, while in emerging markets (2) it was 26%. (1) Includes data for UK, US, Germany, Canada and France. (2) 
Includes data for Brazil, Russia, India and Mexico. 
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Interestingly, in Africa, Middle East and Latin America, users rely mainly on 
prepaid phone plans. Consequently, carriers have little insight of who their clients are 
and this is, once again, an opportunity for companies like TIMWE, since they can draw 
a profile and create a database of end users based on the services provided. 
 Challenges 
TIMWE could anticipate some sensitive points that could undermine the 
achievement of the defined goals. Its medium-term strategy of increasing the 
international presence was tangible but challenging. It required an integration between 
the different dimensions associated with the company and the business, namely between 
the different geographies, clients’ relationships and markets’ needs. Moreover, the focus 
in emerging markets would bring an extra dose of risk associated with the lower 
maturity of the democracies and institutions. Although developing a cohesive company 
would not be an easy task, TIMWE knew the risks it would face and it was counting on 
its most valuable asset – the management team - to mitigate them the best way it could. 
TIMWE’s business was highly dependent on third parties - mobile carriers and 
technology providers - and on its ability to deliver innovative services.  Although 
TIMWE played an important role, the leading one belonged to mobile carriers, as the 
latter were responsible for delivering the content/service and billing it. A healthy 
relation was crucial for the balance and sustainability of the business, since a 
disagreement could end up destroying the business relation and, ultimately, TIMWE. 
Another important actor that should not be ignored was the content providers. Although 
TIMWE had in-house production, it was dependent on external content and so, 
maintaining good relations with them was essential to assure the diversity and 
completeness of the portfolio and, consequently, the overall attractiveness of the 
services provided. Exhibit 12 describes the industry value-chain. 
Taking a financial perspective, TIMWE could be considered a company with 
good financial results and high operating leverage. Revenues were generally reported by 
carriers, since the company could not monitor sales, and were relatively variable. 
However, operational expenses did not follow the same path, being fixed in the short-
term. If for any reason revenues decreased, this would not be followed by an immediate 
decrease of operating expenses, affecting the financials of the company, at least, in the 
short-term.  
TIMWE faced another challenge regarding the daily operations: the net working 
capital requirements. Due to its dependence on third parties, namely content providers, 
to deliver its services, TIMWE had a limited bargaining power on the suppliers’ side – 
who demanded payments within a short period of time. On the other hand, the vast 
majority of the sales were made through the carriers who, realising the dominant 
position, negotiated unfavourable payment terms for the company. Exhibit 13 presents 
selected financial information. 
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This business was about delivering services with quality, assuring the 
functioning of technology and the satisfaction of end users and, in order to be a 
successful player, TIMWE had to build a strong reputation with clients – mobile 
carriers and end users. If the previously enumerated risks materialized, reputational 
costs would be significant and this could compromise the future of the company.   
Initial public offering (IPO) 
By the beginning of 2011, TIMWE had achieved a comfortable position with 
established business relations and an impressive record of more than 200 M€ in 
revenue. From the beginning, Salvi’s vision was to take TIMWE public on the 
NASDAQ. Nonetheless, the board knew that going public was a decisive step that 
would drastically change the organization and positioning of the company.  
At that moment, the main reasons to go public were to raise capital, to reduce 
the dependence on banks, and to create brand recognition and customer awareness. 
TIMWE had followed a short but demanding path up to now and going public would 
reinforce the idea of stability. This was crucial since TIMWE’s business was completely 
dependent on third parties, those who effectively distribute the content, being credibility 
an invaluable weapon when competing against the other, less transparent, players. An 
indirect gain from being public would be the alignment of incentives across the 
hierarchy as the company’s objectives would be public and any deviation would impact 
the share’s price, posing a stronger incentive to employees. Finally, stronger corporate 
governance standards would have to be imposed and TIMWE would be subject to a 
tighter control and monitoring. 
The gains from being public would only be achieved at a cost, and thus a 
thorough cost-benefit analysis would have to be done. Costs included legal, accounting 
and investment bankers’ fees
12
 - around 10% of the total amount raised; information 
disclosure imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; balance between short-term and 
long-term strategy as markets would react negatively to variations in results, promoting 
short-termism.  
 TIMWE as an IPO candidate 
The definition of a successful IPO candidate is linked with its ability to attract 
investors and TIMWE knew that, more important than its recent double digit revenue 
growth rate
13
, were the future prospects of the company and what it would be able to 
reach in the future. TIMWE’s ability to have a successful offering could also be 
anticipated by factors such as industry, product, financial indicators and 
communication. 
                                                             
12 These fees are incurred when doing an IPO. On the following years, the company needs to pay a yearly fee to the 
stock exchange to continue listed. 
13 From 2002 to 2012, TIMWE experienced a compounded annual rate of 90% - more information on the revenue 
evolution is presented in exhibit 14. 
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At an industry level, TIMWE benefited from being in a multitude of fragmented 
markets, i.e., it faced fierce competition locally but it did not have a competitor able to 
provide the three services at the international scale. Additionally, this was a fast-
growing market that would offer more opportunities for the company to expand and 
achieve the forecasted levels. However, being a relatively young company – ten years - 
would scare away some investors that would find this to be too risky. TIMWE was also 
well-positioned to what concerns the product or service provided, since its portfolio was 
fashionable, although not differentiated from its competitors. 
TIMWE could then draw the profile of its target: investors seeking large capital 
gains derived from the strong expected growth. So far, the scenario was very optimistic 
and the team acknowledged that this would be worthless if investors did not understand 
the business. The team needed to communicate the business model and the strategy in a 
way that investors wanted to invest in the firm. This implied time and dedication of the 
management team, at a cost of a potential impact on the daily operations of the company 
due to the punctual deviation of focus. 
 Market conditions 
When launching the IPO, TIMWE had to take into account the timing, as it 
could have a dominant impact on the outcome of the offering. Nonetheless, since the 
crash of 2008, there had not been such a thing as a perfect timing and so, they would 
have to take part of market window openings. 
By mid-2011, the US IPO market seemed to have cheered up and the slowdown 
experienced in the second half of the year could be partially explained by the European 
debt crisis. As represented in exhibit 15, the number of deals and capital raised in 2010 
was significantly higher than in the previous two years. Moreover, the Tech sector was 
the one with the most deals in the previous two years and it was on the top two 
regarding the capital raised. Finally, NASDAQ had more than doubled the number of 
deals from 2009 to 2010, from 30 (total of $8,1 B) to 76 deals (total of $8,7 B). 
Although indicators seemed to be favourable, there was a lot of uncertainty 
regarding the second half of the year and the following year. 
 The offering 
One of the reasons to go public was the access to capital markets. TIMWE was 
going to use the proceeds from the sale to accelerate expansion into new markets, 
enhance its monetization solutions portfolio through new developments and strengthen 
its capacity to grow inorganically, i.e. by pursuing strategic acquisitions. 
TIMWE internally set the price range from $5 to $6 and would sell a total of 
13,7 M shares, 11,9 M new shares and 1,8 M from existing shareholders. Excluding the 
overallotment option of 15%, net proceeds would be approximately $49,3 M and the 
11 
 
market capitalization would be around $340 M. A description of the amount of shares 
and proceeds from the sale can be found in exhibit 16. 
 Take 1: 2011 
After taking these issues in consideration, the board decided to launch the IPO. 
They selected the investment banks that would support the company throughout this 
process and this was, again, a strategic decision – investment banks were responsible for 
the book building, so it was crucial to choose the ones that were able to reach the right 
investors. They ended up with the Credit Suisse Securities and Citigroup Global– global 
coordinators as joint book-running managers; Needham & Company, LLC; Pacific 
Crest Securities; Santander and ThinkEquity LLC – were also hired as underwriters. 
Being both Credit Suisse and Citigroup on the “Underwriter League Tables”
14
, 




 position, proves their successful track record and justifies 
their choice as leading underwriters. Needham & Company, LLC and Pacific Crest
15
 
were chosen due to their expertise in “Internet, Digital Media & Consumer” and “high-
growth technology companies”, respectively.  
When preparing the IPO, companies are aware of the level of information that 
will be disclosed and, particularly in the US, everything has to be in the prospectus. 
There is no room for missing information and, again, having the right “counsellors” 
makes a difference. With all the legal requirements met, the board started the road show 
around the world. It was essential to capture investors’ attention and transmit the 
potential of the company. 
In August 2011, the company decided to suspend the IPO. Mere misfortune was 
the main factor to blame. A combination of negative events, namely the European 
Sovereign debt crisis, the downgrade of US rating, the fall of the NASDAQ and IPO 
market culminated in the stock markets falling
16
. In any other circumstance, investors 
would perceive this as a sign of weakness but, given the exceptional circumstances, this 
decision was understood by the markets and the company knew it could, in the future, 
have another chance. 
 Take 2: 2012 
TIMWE was able to smooth the consequences of this decision because there was 
not a desperate need for raising money. However, Salvi knew this could change in the 
future and so, going public continued to be part of the company’s agenda. At the 
beginning of 2012, a slight recovery in the markets boosted the company’s confidence 
and the prospectus was re-done. TIMWE, supported by the same investment banks, was 
                                                             
14 Based on the “Global Equity, Equity-linked & Rights”, by Bloomberg, and refers to 2011. This ranking includes all 
eligible equity and equity-linked offerings and it is based on the weighted average disclosed fees. 
15 Needham had been the joint-lead manager of the Velti’s IPO in 2011 and Pacific Crest belonged to the syndicate of 
Facebook’s underwriters.  
16 Exhibit 17 graphs the price evolution of NASDAQ and PSI20. 
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now ready to face this journey for the second time and, hopefully, complete the 
offering.  
For the second time, in April 2012, board and management devoted their time 
and effort throughout long sessions trying to explain to investors what the company was 
and what it aimed to achieve. Investors had incurred in significant losses during the 
crisis and so, although reticent, they were willing to invest to recover part of the loss. 
In the meantime, Portugal was having a difficult time due to the requirements 
imposed by the Economic Adjustment Programme, which was negotiated with the ECB, 
IMF and EC
17
. Interestingly, TIMWE found two very different perspectives regarding 
the nationality of the company: in Europe, TIMWE was perceived by investors as a 
Portuguese company that could be contaminated by the sovereign debt crisis, 
representing a risky investment; in the USA, it was a worldwide company with a 
minority position in Portugal – 3% of its revenues – that had the risk spread across 
different locations. This prejudice was recurrent when Portuguese companies tried to 
seek financing abroad and little action was possible to overcome it. Regardless of this 
obstacle, bankers had been building the book.  
As the IPO process started to take shape, external conditions seemed to worsen. 
Facebook was also on the process to go public and, if expectations materialised, its IPO 
would be a success. The consequences on the markets were unclear since it could either 
cheer them or increase their reluctance.  
 Velti 
When doing the valuation of a company, investors rely among other things on 
information from comparable companies to set the price they are willing to pay for the 
share. TIMWE’s closest comparable was Velti, a Greek technology company that 
provided mobile marketing and advertising solutions at a global scale. It went public in 
January 2011 on NASDAQ at a share price of $12 but it had been fluctuating 
significantly reaching minimums below $6.  
The outcome of the Greek legislative elections on May 6
th
, 2012 triggered a 




of May, it decreased from $10,65 to 
$5,72. TIMWE’s board was concerned that this unstable behaviour could contaminate 
investors’ expectations and decrease valuations, increasing uncertainty around the odds 




 was a crucial day and as the context worsened, Salvi needed to make a 
decision. On one hand, he had the support of the underwriters that had invested time and 
                                                             
17 Portugal had asked for external support in April 2011. 
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money on this IPO and wanted to conclude it to earn the commission associated with 
the sale of the shares. On the other, TIMWE had been experiencing unparalleled growth 
and, although some vectors for growth would be compromised by the cancelation of the 
offering, the company would continue to grow – however, at a lower than optimal rate.  
After all, would the poor environment be more important than this promising 
business model? What would be the consequences of the decision? Could TIMWE, an 




Exhibit 1 Mobile phone penetration per 100 subscriptions. Note: grey cells correspond 









Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Telecommunication/Information and 
communication technologies (ICT) indicators database. 
Exhibit 2 Ownership distribution as of 31
st









Source: TIMWE’s Prospectus 2012 
Exhibit 3 Information regarding the opening of international offices 
Mobile-cellular subscriptions (%) 2000 2001 2002 
Argentina 17,57 18,07 17,44 
Austria 76,42 81,37 83,33 
Brazil 13,29 16,25 19,46 
Chile 22,06 32,69 39,56 
Colombia 5,68 8,08 11,19 
Netherlands 67,80 76,47 75,41 
Singapore 70,10 75,15 82,16 
Spain 60,23 72,74 81,06 
Taiwan, Province of China 81,48 98,59 109,55 
Turkey 25,36 30,32 35,64 
United Kingdom 73,80 78,32 82,96 
Location Date 
 Lisbon 
 Colombia and Argentina 
 Chile and Turkey 
 Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay, Poland, United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, 
Hong Kong 
 Spain and Mozambique 
 Peru, Nicaragua and Malaysia 


















Exhibit 4 TIMWE’s footprint:   represents the Lisbon office;   identifies the locations 










Source: TIMWE’s corporate presentation 
Exhibit 5 Distribution of revenues across geographies from 2009 until 2011 
(in thousands) 2009 2010 2011 
Weight as % of total revenue 
(2011) 
Brazil   66.860 €  103.173 €  122.313 €  43% 
Andean(1) 17.316 €  35.991 €  35.553 €  13% 
South Cone(2)  37.229 €  28.006 €  24.617 €  9% 
Mexico 15.257 €  17.969 €  19.625 €  7% 
EECA(3)  2.866 €    7.525 €  11.465 €  4% 
Middle East(4)  1.194 €    2.864 €    8.212 €  3% 
Europe(5) 19.799 €  21.706 €  24.344 €  9% 
Africa  5.491 €  14.318 €  30.402 €  11% 
North America    -   €  698 €  588 €  0% 
APAC(6)   229 €     1.601 €  4.156 €  1% 
Total 166.241 €  233.851 €  281.275 €   
Source: TIMWE’s Prospectus 2012 
(1) Includes: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, El Salvador and Venezuela. (2) Includes: Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
(3) “Eastern Europe and Central Asia” and includes: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. (4) Includes: Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. (5) Includes: Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. (6) “Asia Pacific” and includes: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 









Source: TIMWE’s Prospectus 2012 
Exhibit 7 Comparison between the penetration of mobiles, bank accounts and credit 
cards in emerging and developed markets 
Source: TIMWE’s Prospectus 2012.  
(1)  Includes 2009 data for US, Canada, UK, Germany and France. (2) Includes 2009 data for Brazil, 
Russia, India and Mexico with respect to mobile and bank account penetration. (3) Includes 2009 data for 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, Korea and Mexico, regarding emerging markets. 
Exhibit 8 Example of the application of mobile money. M-coin service in three steps:  
1 End users choose a content to buy with M-coin;  
2   End users have to insert their mobile number in order to receive a SMS with the pin number;  







Source: M-Coin website (http://www.mcoin.com) 
Mobile Marketing 
 Mobile carriers: Telefonica, Unitel, America Movil and TIM Brazil 
 Media groups: SBT, Record, TPA, SIC and Controlinvest 
 Goverment and NGO: Accion Social (Colombia) and Instituto Technologico y Estudios 
Superiores de Monterrey (Mexico) 
 Brand owners: Kellogg’s, HP, Coca-Cola, Activo Bank and Pfizer 







Developed markets (1) Emerging markets (2)
Mobile penetration
Bank account penetration
Credit Card penetration (3)
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Exhibit 9 Distribution of revenues between the three services: Mobile Marketing, 
Mobile Entertainment and Mobile Money 
(in thousands) 2009 2010 2011 Weight in total revenue (2011) 
Mobile Entertainment 107.534 € 116.185 € 132.601 € 47% 
Mobile Marketing 54.154 € 101.320 € 117.707 € 42% 
Mobile Money 4.552 € 16.346 € 30.967 € 11% 
Total Revenues 166.240 € 233.851 € 281.275 € --- 
Source: TIMWE’s Prospectus 2012 
Exhibit 10 Number of mobile phone connections expected in 2011 and 2016 (Millions) 
Source: TIMWE’s Prospectus 2012. Data from “Analysis Mason (2011)” 
Exhibit 11 Evolution of mobile-phone and internet penetration from 2001 to 2013 (Note: 
* estimate) 
 
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Telecommunication/Information and 
communication technologies (ICT) indicators database 
Exhibit 12 Simplified representation of the industry value chain 
a) TIMWE as an intermediary  
 
b) TIMWE as the main player, delivering services directly to end users 
 
 96,2  








































Middle East and Africa North America Western Europe
2011 E
2016 E
TIMWE Mobile carriers End users 
TIMWE End users 
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Exhibit 13 Selected financial data (in thousands, except for per-share data) 
a) Balance sheet 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Cash and cash equivalents    8.610 € 11.873 € 
Trade receivables    25.431 € 35.325 € 
Inventories    72 € 69 € 
Prepaid expenses and other assets    3.238 € 8.948 € 
Current income tax expenses    3.280 € 1.519 € 
Other tax expenses    4.647 € 3.597 € 
Current assets    45.278 € 61.331 € 
Property and equipment    2.775 €  2.155 € 
Capitalized technology    5.536 € 4.945 € 
Other intangible assets    3.139 € 12.358 € 
Goodwill    642 € 642 € 
Deferred income tax expenses    2.119 € 4.360 € 
Other assets    87 € 101 € 
Non-current assets    14.298 € 24.561 € 
      
Total assets 24.000 € 40.049 € 46.738  € 59.576 € 85.892 € 
      
Accounts payable    20.084 € 28.328 € 
Liabilities related to factoring 
operations 
   1.181 € 461 € 
Current portion of LT debt    2.521 € 13.352 € 
Current portion of finance lease 
obligations 
   1.038 € 746 € 
Current tax liabilities    535 € 1.862 € 
Other taxes    887 € 1.453 € 
Current liabilities    26.246 € 46.202 € 
Provisions    699 € 1.009 € 
LT debt    7.314 € 3.880 € 
LT portion of finance lease 
obligations 
   1.036 € 611 € 
Deferred income tax liabilities    269 € 337 € 
Non-current liabilities    9.318 € 5.837 € 
Total liabilities 16.923 € 31.684 € 32.729 € 35.564 € 52.039 € 
Total equity 7.077 € 8.365 € 14.009 € 24.012 € 33.853 € 
Total equity and liabilities 24.000 € 40.049 € 46.738 € 59.576 € 85.892 € 
Total capitalization     38,344€  
D/E    54,4% 56,3% 

























Cash and cash equivalents 3.886 € 4.456 € 5.667 € 8.610 € 11.873 € 
Net working capital 5.725 € 14.222 € 11.284 € 19.032 € 15.129 € 
Capital Expenditures   5.300 € 6.100 € 13.200 € 
      
Total debt 4.329 € 15.973 € 10.204 € 9.835 € 17.232 € 
d) Debt convenants 
Financial covenants: a maximum debt–to–EBITDA ratio and a minimum equity–to–
total net assets ratio. 
Non-financial covenants: providing financial statements to the bank in a timely manner, 
current stockholders should maintain at least 51% ownership, and TIMWE shall not 
sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of 20% of its assets without the express consent of the 
lenders. 
















Revenues   67.813 €  125.339 €  166.241 €  233.851 €  281.275 €  
Operating Expenses:      
Cost of service delivery 32.118 €  65.059 €   97.056 €  117.318 €  144.550 €  
Commercial and production costs 21.511 €   35.292 €  37.130 €  76.025 €  88.573 €  
Personnel costs  4.430 €    6.519 €   8.758 €  9.585 €  11.092 €  
General and administrative  3.258 €   6.162 €  6.980 €  7.526 €   8.749 €  
Tax expenses 420 €  2.150 €   2.306 €  3.263 €  3.212 €  
Amortization and depreciation  517 €  1.605 €  2.490 €  4.225 €  5.419 €  
Provisions expense 853 €  116 €  405 €  589 €   483 €  
Total operating expense 63.107 €  116.903 €  155.125 €  218.531 €  262.078 €  
Operating profit (EBIT) 4.706 €  8.436 €  11.116 €  15.320 €  19.197 €  
Finance income 511 €   570 €  139 €   1.650 €  1.272 €  
Finance costs - 687 €  - 1.500 €  - 2.415 €  -2.576 €  - 2.535 €  
Net finance income (costs) - 176 €  -    930 €  - 2.276 €  -   926 €  - 1.263 €  
Profit before income taxes (EBT) 4.530 €  7.506 €  8.840 €  14.394 €  17.934 €  
Income tax expenses -  1.973 €  - 2.119 €  - 1.676 €  -  3.389 €  - 3.776 €  
















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Revenues (Million Euros) 
CAGR 90% 
Exhibit 14 Evolution of TIMWE’s revenues from 2004 up to 2012. The compounded 







Source: TIMWE’s corporate presentation 
Exhibit 15 Description of IPO activity in US from 2004 to 2011 
 
Source: “Global IPO trends 2012 – Prepare early, move fast”, Ernst & Young 
Exhibit 16 Offering data: number of common shares that will be issued and 
corresponding proceeds from the sale 
Source: TIMWE’s Prospectus 2012 
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 “Total proceeds net of underwriting discounts and estimated expenses of the offering payable by TIMWE. No 
proceeds from the sale of the selling shareholders will be received. The estimated expenses include 3 M€ to be paid to 
TIMWE’s employees”, TIMWE’s prospectus. Exchange rate = $1,2973 per 1,00 €. 





















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011















Proceeds from sale 
Without exercising 
option 




+ 1,027,500 + 1,027,500 15,755 M 62.927.500 
$54,6 M if 
overallotment option is 
exercised in full. 
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Exhibit 17 Evolution of NASDAQ and PSI 20 prices. Portuguese Stock Index 20 – PSI 
20 - is the stock market index of companies that trade on Euronext Lisbon, Portugal’s 
main stock exchange. The 20 listings correspond to the companies with the largest 












Exhibit 18 Information about the comparable Velti 
1. Shares price evolution from January 2011 until April 2012 
 
Source: Yahoo finance, symbol VELT 





Source: “Annual Report 2011 VELTI PLC – Form 20-F”.  
 Velti 
EBITDA  $53.077.000  
Debt  $ 9.625.000 
Revenue  $ 189.202.000  
Adjusted Net income  $29.005.000  






















TIMWE’s case should be interpreted as a case of a successful Portuguese 
company that achieved impressive results in such a short period of time. The discussion 
of the case study should cover the different aspects involved in an IPO, including the 
choice of the investment banks and market to list the company, the context and the main 
difficulties in marketing the company. Additionally, the prejudice of being a Portuguese 
company should also be analysed, as well as the capital structure of the company. 
Students should also discuss whether TIMWE should or not cancel the IPO. Proposed 
questions and solutions are presented below. 
1. Define the source of early financing. 
In 2002, when the company started, the minimal initial investment was made by 
the founders. This type of financing – bootstrapping – is characteristic of ventures in an 
early stage, when founders do not want to make significant physical investments and the 
company is still too infant to be able to attract outside financing.  
2. How was TIMWE able to raise debt from banks in its early days? 
From the beginning, TIMWE had positive results (EBITDA>0, profit>0) since it 
was able to sell its services, incurring in minimal costs. Banks, realizing the 
sustainability of the business and the internal capacity to generate income, had little 
reserves to what concern lending small amounts of money to the company. 
3. What was the true motivation behind the IPO? Was the capital structure 
optimal? 
The decision of going public is based on several factors, namely the need to 
recapitalize the company. TIMWE had relied on debt financing and retained earnings to 
support its growth but the board knew that a ratio of 56,3% of debt-to-equity could be a 
warning signal. The ability to create value through the PV of tax shield is limited to the 
optimal (D/E). From that point onwards, the cost of financial distress dominates. 
Additionally, the debt covenants posed a restriction to the decision-makers, reinforcing 
the need to find alternative financing sources. Financial covenants included a maximum 
debt–to–EBITDA ratio and a minimum equity–to–total net assets ratio; and non-
financial covenants included providing financial statements to the bank in a timely 
manner, requirements that current stockholders should maintain at least 51% ownership, 
and TIMWE shall not sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of 20% of its assets without the 
express consent of the lenders. 
A successful IPO would represent more than a significant capital injection; it 
would bring liquidity to the shares of the company and, consequently, TIMWE could 
use them as a mean of payment. Not only the company would be recapitalized, having 
more equity, but it would also reduce the dependence on debt and the burden associated 
with it. The envisioned inorganic growth could be achieved, as well as, other 
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opportunities that in the past TIMWE was not able to exploit due to the abovementioned 
limitations.   
4. Do you agree with TIMWE’s decision of going public in the NASDAQ? 
(Compare with going public in an European exchange, e.g.) 
The decision of where to go public is crucial and should take into account a 
series of factors. Firstly, companies need to study the market and identify the investors’ 
base. At first glance, an American exchange is the safest choice since it is the deepest 
pool of liquidity. When compared to the NYSE Euronext Lisbon – home market -, it is 
clear that the number of potential investors willing to invest in this exchange is smaller, 
due to the lower credibility, historic of transactions and number of companies listed. 
Secondly, it is important to go public in a market where the brand will be 
boosted, as well as, credibility. Investing in the US would, again, be a better option. 
American exchanges are broadly recognized as being more regulated and, consequently, 
safer and more transparent. Additionally, it is unquestionable that the most well-known 
stocks are listed in the US and so, this will positively affect the ambitioned brand 
recognition. Nonetheless, companies should be aware that this comes at a cost since 
more information will have to be disclosed and there will be costs associated with it. 
Thirdly, in the case of European companies and, particularly, Portuguese, due to 
the difficult economic situation, there is an extra-level of prejudice when it comes to 
choose them to invest. For European investors, a Portuguese company is perceived as 
having the same risk as the country, regardless of its performance and exposure to the 
home market. In the US, investors have a different perspective, privileging the origin of 
income and spread of operations.  Doing an IPO in Europe would be a challenge since, 
not only the base of investors is smaller, but also being a Portuguese company would 
reduce the odds of having enough investors willing to invest at the expected price. 
The final question is between NASDAQ and NYSE. The main reason to choose 
NASDAQ is linked to the nature of the exchange as it is usually referred to as a “high-
tech” market and its stocks are considered more volatile and more growth oriented. 
Additionally, when compared to NYSE, both the entry and the yearly fees are much 
smaller. For example, the entry fee in the NYSE is up to $250.000, while in NASDAQ 
it is between $50.000 and $75.000. All in all, TIMWE’s decision of going public in 
NASDAQ provides the best “price-quality” relation. 
5. What was the main difficulty when marketing this company to investors? 
TIMWE does not have a competitor that can offer the same portfolio of services 
in all of its regions. Consequently, when it came to set the price, investors were not able 
to cover the complete range of characteristic, potentially under-valuing the company. 
Additionally, despite the long list of companies offering partially similar services, there 
were only a few that are public, meaning there was little information available. 
24 
 
All in all, the main difficulty was the inexistence of a truly comparable that 
could work as reference to the valuation exercises. From an investors’ perspective, Velti 
seemed to fit not only in terms of product - provider of mobile marketing services at a 
global scale -, but also to what regards the challenges associated with the deep crisis. 
Velti had done the IPO the year before and it was a Greek company – Greece was also 
struggling to “survive” the crisis and to comply with the impositions of Troika.  
6. Would the poor environment be more important than this promising business 
model? Provide a valuation of the company based on the multiples method. 
TIMWE was facing, for the second time, a very difficult situation, since there 
were investors willing to put their money on the table but at a conservative price. 
Investors would have to rely on multiples from Velti to do the valuation.  
Based on the valuation above, by May 1
st
, the price offered would be between [$ 
4,62; $ 5,12], below the $ 5,5 envisioned by the company. TIMWE’s price would be 
driven down by the deteriorating position of its comparable. By May 16
th
, due to the 
Greek elections, multiples were sharply dropping. A promising business model at the 
wrong time has less changes of being successful than an uninteresting business model 
during booms. During a crisis, investors are less willing to invest, risk aversion 
increases and obstacles facing the business will have a great impact, limiting the scope 
of the business and the odds of success.  
7. Discuss the role of investment banks and why they supported the IPO despite the 
deteriorating market conditions. 
Underwriters are the ones which have a better overview of the whole process 
since they are the ones responsible for the book building and for marketing the 
company. When they show a yellow card, it signals their scepticism regarding the odds 
of the IPO and it warns the company that the offer may not be completed.  
Investment banks (IB) were selected due to their past results and reputation. 
Bankers will be used as a channel to reach the right investors and this is what 
                                                             
19 Net debt = debt-cash 
 Velti TIMWE Multiple: EV/EBITDA Multiple: P/E 
EBITDA  $ 53.077.000  $ 36.727.860   
Debt  $ 9.625.000 $ 17.232.000   
Revenue  $ 189.202.000     
Net income  $ 29.005.000  $ 18.367.173   
Number of shares (1) 61.816.000 61.900.000   
Market Cap (1)*(2)  $451.256.800  
EV – Net Debt19 =  
$ 317.088.686 
P/E * net income = $ 285.754.590  
EV [(1)*(2)+debt] $ 460.881.800  
 (EV/EBITDA) * EBITDA =  
$ 318.917.843 
 
EV/EBITDA 8,68    
P/E 15,56    
Share price (2) $ 7,3  Mkt cap / # shares = $ 5,12 Mkt cap / # shares = $ 4,62 
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companies are actually paying for. Underwriters are well aware of this and they end up 
playing a double game. Consequently, there is a clear conflict of interest. On one side, 
they are being paid by the company to assure the success of the IPO and they have an 
incentive to sell shares at the highest price possible because it will be reflected on their 
commissions. On the other, in order to continue to succeed in the IPO market, IBs have 
to offer attractive deals to institutional investors, which materialize in reduced prices. 
Nonetheless, the consequences of selling at lower prices are wider since it reduces IBs’ 
risk of not having enough demand for the shares; it increases the odds of making money 
with the Greenshoe option and, finally, it will represent gains to buyers from the 
underpricing. However, in the medium term, issuers will tend to “run away” from IBs 
that systematically underprice offers. 
In this case, IBs had invested time and money through the two IPO attempts and 
commissions would only be paid if TIMWE managed to go public. Realizing that their 
image would not be damaged by this IPO, IBs maintained their support, leaving the 
decision up to the CEO.  
8. What would be the impact on TIMWE of another failed IPO? Could they be 
taken seriously by investors should they go for a third attempt? 
TIMWE was, by now, in a dilemma: go or no go. If it decided to continue and 
go public at any cost, it would need to face the unknown and the risk associated with 
low prices on the selling. Nonetheless, it would be a public company with future access 
to capital markets, when markets started to boom. However, if TIMWE decided to 
cancel the IPO it would be conditioning the access to capital markets, at least in the 
medium term. This was the second attempt and reputational costs would be significant 
if it ever tried to go public again.  
TIMWE made a decision of restarting the process a few months after calling it 
off for the first time. The cancellation of the first IPO was understood by investors since 
they recognized that companies could not control the negative external factors but the 
second would not be. The question is whether the present value of future reputational 
costs plus the costs associated with re-doing the process (IB, lawyers, e.g.), would 
outweigh the losses associated with the low valuations. 
What happened? 
Diogo Salvi and his team decided to cancel this second attempt of going public 
on May 17
th
. In reality and contrary to what was expected given the circumstances, 
there was book building but at prices below the internally set. The losses that the 
company would suffer were lower than the ones if the decision was to complete the 
offering. From the beginning, TIMWE managed to grow without significant capital 
injections and there were no reasons to believe that this would change. As stated in the 
case, calling off the IPO could hinder the company to achieve the optimal growth but it 
would not prevent it to continue to grow, although at a slower pace. 
